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1 Introduction
How we can reliably draw inferences from data, evidence and/or experience has been
and continues to be a pressing question in everyday life, the sciences, politics and
a number of branches in philosophy (traditional epistemology, social epistemology,
formal epistemology, logic and philosophy of the sciences). In a world in which we
can now longer fully rely on our experiences, interlocutors, measurement instruments,
data collection and storage systems and even news outlets to draw reliable inferences,
the issue becomes even more pressing.
While we were working on this question using a formal epistemology approach
Landes and Osimani (2020); De Pretis et al. (2019); Osimani and Landes (2020);
Osimani (2020), we realised that the width of current active interests in the notion of
reliabilitywasmuch broader thanwe initially thought. Given the breadth of approaches
and angles present in philosophy (even in this journal Schubert 2012; Avigad 2021;
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Claveau and Grenier 2019; Kummerfeld and Danks 2014; Landes 2021; Trpin et al.
2021; Schippers 2014; Schindler 2011; Kelly et al. 2016; Mayo-Wilson 2014; Olsson
and Schubert 2007; Pittard 2017), we thought that it would be beneficial to provide
a forum for an open exchange of ideas, in which philosophers working in different
paradigms could come together. Our call for expression of interest received a great
variety of promised manuscripts, the variety is reflected in the published papers. They
range from fields far away from our own interests such as quantum probabilities
de Ronde et al. (2021), evolvable software systems Primiero et al. (2021), to topics
closer to our own research in the philosophy of medicine Lalumera et al. (2020),
psychology Dutilh et al. (2021), traditional epistemology Dunn (2021); Tolly (2021)
to finally close shared interests in formal epistemology Romero and Sprenger (2021)
even within our own department Merdes et al. (2021).
Our job is now to reliably inform you about all the contributions in the papers in
this special issue. Unfortunately, that task is beyond our capabilities. What we can and
instead do is to summarise the contributed papers to inform your reliable inference to
read them all in great detail.
2 Contributions
2.1 Traditional epistemology
In line with the focus on the semantic analysis of knowledge claims, typical of con-
temporary analytic epistemology, Tolly (2021) shifts the focus from the definition of
knowledge, to that of reliable knowledge, or, more precisely, knowledge-enabling reli-
ability. Tolly draws on the notion of multi-type evidential reliabilism (MTE) and the
standard toolset of counterfactual semantics, in order to identify the truth conditions
for a learning process to be defined as reliable: knowledge-enabling reliability requires
a process token to be reliable with respect to multiple content-evidence pairs (i.e., the
propositional content of the knowledge items, and the related evidential basis), each
with varying degrees of specificity. By using the notion of similarity across worlds
and developing a model that assigns multiple types to any given token of knowledge
process, MTE describes reliability as a concentric multi-type structure: every relevant
type that belongs to a given token has a different degree of specificity. These differ-
ing degrees of specificity are defined by a similarity relation and measurements of
conceptual difference. A token’s specific content-evidence pair is something akin to
an ’anchor-point’ for determining all of the other relevant types. By describing the
multiple relevant types that determine whether a given token generates knowledge-
enabling reliability, MTE successfully meets the specificity challenge, a formidable
objection to reliabilism Feldman (1998), while at the same time retaining Come-
sana’s insight Comesaña (2006) that reliability crucially depends on a token’s precise
content-evidence pair. Readers interested in the context-sensitivity of causation and
the related reference class problem will find interesting family resemblances with the
debate sketched in this contribution.
The question of how to aggregate judgements of a plurality of agents into a rational
collective judgement represents an intriguing and relevant problem in epistemology
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and in the theory of social choice. Apart from the epistemological nature of the intrin-
sic theoretical challenges arising in the discipline of judgement aggregation [see for
instance List and Puppe (2009)], its pragmatical relevance is mainly due to the high
stake of decisions that may involve certain groups. Example of such group-decisions
include, for instance, those taken by boards of experts called to decide whether a
certain drug has to be approved for the market (after testing) or not, or the Federal
Reserve Board believing whether or not the interest rates should be raised.
Dunn (2021) focuses on the question whether group beliefs are justified and reli-
able, assuming that one can speak about group beliefs. Indeed, there is no agreement
concerning how group beliefs are formed. For this reason, Dunn (2021) relies on the
idea proposed by Goldman (2014) that “group beliefs are formed according to some
belief aggregation function”. In particular, Goldman’s account can be sketched via the
so-called Social Process Reliabilism (SPR), which is founded on the conditional relia-
bility of the aggregation procedure (one can think at “simple majority” as an example
of aggregation rule). Conditional reliability of the aggregation rule can be rephrased
as follows: “when enough of input beliefs have a high probability of being true, the
output group belief is usually true”. In words, this means that the reliability of group
beliefs depends substantially more on the reliability of the single judgements than on
that of the aggregation rule that has been used. A point that indeed leaves room for
criticism. The new position defended by Dunn (2021) is opposite: “a group belief is
justified just in case the group belief-forming procedure as used by the group in ques-
tion is reliable.” Roughly speaking, it is the reliability of the aggregation operators
that becomes more important than single agents’ judgments.
2.2 Formal epistemology and the replication crisis
There are two main formal models of source reliability and confirmation in the current
literature on Bayesian epistemology Bovens and Hartmann (2003); Olsson (2011).
Merdes et al. here provide an analysis of normative components of themodels and they
investigate the accuracy of the models by means of large-scale computer simulations.
While the model in Bovens and Hartmann (2003) only has reliable agents (perfect
inquirers) and “randomizing” agents (reporting the outcome of a coin flip disconnected
from the issue at stake) the Olsson (2011) model incorporates a continuum of agent
reliability types including the types in Bovens and Hartmann (2003).
Despite this and further differences between both models, Merdes et al. (2021)
report surprising similarities, they discovered in their simulations.Of particular interest
might be how the well the models learn that a source is lying (reporting falsehoods).
Although, the Olsson (2011) model has a build-in capacity to learn that a source is
lying, it fails in certain scenarios to learn that the source is indeed lying and produces
credences which are only marginally less inaccurate than the credences produced by
the Bovens and Hartmann (2003) model.
Merdes et al. conclude that “neither model is able to fundamentally solve the
problem of source reliability in circumstances where there is no reference class of
relevant past predictive success that enables outcome-based estimates of the relevant
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likelihoods.” This pessimistic conclusion points to an exciting area for future work
connection (formal) epistemology, statistics and/or computer simulations.
In the wake of the replication crisis, Romero and Sprenger (2021) aim to increase
the reliability of published research. They investigate the suggested statistical reform
to replace frequentist inference (null hypothesis significance testing) by Bayesian
statistics. They compare how accurate these two statistical methodologies fare under
a variety of reporting scenarios and biases operating in the sciences.
Romero and Sprenger extend the computer simulations of Romero (2016) and find
that there is not much difference between both inference methods, if the inconclusive
evidence is published. However, under the more realistic assumption of a present
file drawer effect (inconclusive evidence is not published) they find that Bayesian
inference is considerably more accurate than frequentist inference. They explain this
finding pointing out that under a Bayesian regime strong evidence supporting the null
hypothesis is regularly published, which is not the case under the current frequentist
paradigm. As a result, the Bayesian approach increases accuracy, if the null hypothesis
is true.
Romero and Sprenger conclude that the choice of the statistical framework plays
an important role in increasing the reliability of published research and favour the
Bayesian approach over the frequentist paradigm.
Dutilh et al. (2021) consider the implications of preregistration of statistical analyses
in the face of the replication crisis in the sciences. They argue that while preregistration
is a powerful and increasingly popular method to raise the reliability of empirical
results, it imposes an unwelcome lack of flexibility of statistical analysis. They point to
two recent high-profile studies in which unexpected circumstances forced researchers
to change the preregistered statistical analysis. As a result, the researchers could only
label the analysis as exploratory but not as a confirmatory.
To give statisticians the required freedom to select appropriate statistical analyses
while safeguarding against p-hacking, Dutilh et al. discuss advantages and disadvan-
tages of six methods of analysis blinding by inserting a data manager, who blinds
the data for the analyst. They then give their recommendation of an analysis blinding
method for three different common experimental designs. Since data blinding can only
do the intended job, if the data manager and data analyst follow the rule, the authors
design a simple online blinding protocol.
While recognising limitations of analysis blinding, Dutilh et al. believe, on the basis
of available evidence, that analysis blinding contributes to improving the reliability
of science. They also draw on their personal experiences reporting their thrill at the
stage of unblinding.
In the very unlikely event this primer has not yet enticed you to read their paper,
you nevertheless must check out their paper to read their fantastic cartoon (three pages
long).
2.3 Medicine
Because of the high stakes at play and the increasing awareness of vested interests
strongly impacting the reliability of medical evidence, stricter and stricter evidential
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standards have been developed in view of helping doctors, health professionals and
policy makers orient themselves in such a confusing epistemic environment Osimani
(2020). This is especially valid for pharmaceutical products, whose marketing ince-
tivizesmanipulation of evidence and its disclosure at any stage of the product life cycle.
This generates “information wars” and strong uncertainty. How should the epistemic
community behave in the face of such manipulation strategies?
Holman (2021) addresses this topic by extending the literature on epistemic injus-
tice from dyadic situations—where relevant agents of the knowledge exchange are
essentially divided in two camps—to epistemic communities, which comprehends
two or more, possibly conflicting, sources of evidence, and an audience of agents,
whose behaviour may be more or less strongly impacted by the received information
(e.g. doctors prescribing a given drug). In his analysis he draws on the notion of testi-
monial injustice, which Fricker (1998, 2007) identified as a specific kind of epistemic
injustice, relating to situations where an agent endowed with rational authority (i.e.
both competent and trustworthy) is denied credibility, or suffers a credibility deficit,
and is therefore inhibited in their capacity to deliver knowledge, on the basis of identity
prejudices.
Expanding the notion of epistemic injustice from dyadic cases to group settings
allows one to see that the counterpart of credibility deficit, that is excess credibility
may be a possible generator of epistemic injustice too. This sort of injustice emerges
out of the fact that receivers of the message, qua hearers have unlimited credibility to
assign to the source (hence, as such, credibility is non-finite good), but, qua believers,
they must weigh the relative credibility of conflicting sources (and possibly discard
some of them) in order to update their beliefs in light of contradictory claims. Hence,
apportioning undue credibility to a source of knowledge automatically entails deny-
ing trustworthy competitors to be assigned their due portion of credibility. The sort of
epistemic injustice that excess of credibility generates is denoted by Holman as “col-
lateral epistemic injustice”. This automatically springs from the audience wrongly
apportioning an excess of credibility to a source of information, thereby automatically
undercutting the capacity of other comparatively more reliable sources of evidence of
being duly recognised as such.
Holman hence distinguishes the notion of credibility from that of influence; that is
the degree to which each one of conflicting sources of information may impact the
receivers beliefs: while the former is not finite, the latter is. Hence hearers have the
ethical duty to apportion it judiciously. Holman exemplifies his points by illustrating
the behaviour of the community of doctors faced by conflicting information from
scientific publication, expert opinion, personal experience and promotional material
in evaluating the efficacy and safety of the hormonal treatment DES during the 50s-
60s. By apportioning undue credibility to the information received by pharmaceutical
detailers, doctors automatically dismissed any other conflicting evidence from much
more authoritative sources and discarded them.
A further consequence of these considerations is that the value-apt ideal John
(2018a, b, 2019) is insufficient. Scientists must not only disclose their non-epistemic
values, whenever these are not shared by the listeners, in order not to infringe their
autonomy. They must also communicate the extent to which, and how, such values
impacted on their inferences and conclusions.
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Related to the value-ladenness of data is also the other contribution in the spe-
cial issue devoted to medical evidence Lalumera et al. (2020), which is rooted in the
tradition of Science and Technology Studies. The paper investigates the reliability of
evidence frommolecular imaging diagnostics by analysing its use in the medical prac-
tice. This perspective is particularly cogent in that the use of advancedmedical imaging
such as PET (positron emission tomography), fMRI (functional magnetic resonance
imaging), or CT (compute tomography) is increasingly prescribed by doctors and
solicited by patients in daily health care. Although the information provided by such
diagnostic tests is material to many important therapeutic, surgical and prophylactic
decisions, the “illusion of immediacy” that such imaging techniques bring with them
may induce a false sense of knowledge and, relatedly, a tendency to overutilization.
Lalumera et al. distinguish three notions of reliability: one concerns the nature of
knowledge and the truth-conduciveness of learning processes (epistemological relia-
bility); another one relates to the accuracy and precision of the instruments put into
place in order to learn from data, with respect to the investigated phenomenon; the
commonsense notion of such dimension of reliability is the proportion of true vs.
false positives and negatives, as measured for instance by test sensitivity or specificity
(methodological reliability); a third notion of reliability is related to the repeatability
and reproducibility of study results (procedural reliability). They then go on to assess
the status of molecular imaging techniques with respect to these dimensions of reli-
ability. With respect to the first one, PET imaging is heavily theory mediated in that
the pixels that form the output image, are the results of a numerical conversion of
photon collision events, associated with hyperglycolisis, itself explained as a an effect
of various malignant tumors, according to Warburg’s theory of cancer. The translation
of hyperglycolisis phenomena into pixels is mediated by normalization and correction
algorithms; finally the resulting image needs the interpretation of an expert specialised
in reading such diagnostics, who needs to assign a clinical interpretation to the specific
instantiations of such imaging techniques.
One could say that, in the first step, one goes from theory to expected evidence, in
the second one, focus is on the link between the two, in the third one, one goes back
from evidence to theory, as it were, and abduction enters into play in order to subsume
the received evidence into the most plausible diagnostic slot. This step is impacted
not only by obeserver-dependence, but also by the reference-class dependency of test
accuracy. The authors conclude by suggesting three avenues for the improvement
of imaging techniques utilization. Helping the interpretation step by recurring to AI
as an aid to diagnosis; in turn, fostering the harmonization of AI standards through
consensus conferences and Delphi studies; enhancing patient communication, with a
special focus on the limitations, the specific epistemic characteristics of such tests,
and their cost-efficacy profile, with respect to issues of fairness and life values.
2.4 Quantummechanics, computer science and reliability
As evidenced, by the diversity of contributions presented so far in this introduction,
the heterogeneity of contributions appearing in this volume offers a a rich panorama
on the notion of reliability, which extends beyond its traditional boundaries. Such
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extension is particularly evident in de Ronde et al. (2021) and Primiero et al. (2021).
The mentioned papers present indeed the role of reliability in (the foundation) of
Quantum Mechanics and in the theory of change of software systems, respectively.
de Ronde et al. (2021) approaches reliability in the context of one of the most
puzzling philosophical issues raised by quantum mechanics, which is central in the
discussion around the interpretation of the theory: the role and the interpretation of
probability. To sum up the whole problem in a question: which notion of probabil-
ity comes out from quantum theory? Interestingly enough, the answer depends on
the interpretation of quantum theory that one is more likely to embrace, and this
leads to different views of reliability, relevant for our debate. The key role played by
probability in quantum mechanics relies on the famous Born rule: fixing the quantity
〈ψ |H |ψ〉 allows one to predict the average value of an observable H with respect to
a given state of the system, represented by a vector ψ in a Hilbert space (while H
is an Hermitian operator over the same space). It turns out that for the supporters of
the subjective approach to probability, that are found within some of the most popu-
lar interpretations of quantum mechanics, namely the quantum Bayesianism and the
many worlds interpretation, quantum probability represents a “reliable predictive tool
used by agents in order to compute measurement outcomes” (de Ronde et al. (2021),
page 2. Italic is ours). On a different interpretative strand, the objective reading of
quantum probability, substantially endorsed in de Ronde et al. (2021), “understands it
as providing a reliable informational source of a real state of affairs—as theoretically
described by QM.” (de Ronde et al. (2021), page 2. Italic is ours). The analysis of
the different interpretations of quantum probability, and, consequently of reliability in
QM, is finally contextualized within some relevant applications—both for the theory
itself and for its applications—of the theory, namely quantum computation and quan-
tum computational logics [see Freytes and Sergioli (2014), Dalla Chiara et al. (2014)].
Although the vision of probability, understood as a reliable tool for an agent seems
to be grounded in these applications, the new look given to the objective approach
discussed in de Ronde et al. (2021) appears very convincing in the context of quantum
computation.
Slightly changing the field, from quantum to classical computation, an operative
question arises naturally in (theoretical) computer science:when can a software be con-
sidered reliable? Primiero et al. (2021) moves from the consideration that the answer is
necessarily grounded on two concepts: resilience and evolvability. In order to provide
a sketch, on the one hand, resilience of a computational systemmirrors its capability to
“preserve aworking implementation under changed specifications”.On the other hand,
evolvability represents the “ability to successfully accommodate changes, the capac-
ity to generate adaptive variability in tandem with continued persistence and more
generally the system’s ability to survive changes in its environment, requirements and
implementation technologies” [see Ciraci and van den Broek (2006)]. Primiero et al.
(2021) carries out an innovative logical analysis. In particular, the authors introduce a
logical system where formulas trigger change operations and an order relation regu-
lates priorities between functionalities. It turns out that resilience in a software can be
defined via logical consequence. Moreover, this kind of “inferential” approach (to the
notion of resilience) also brings a characterisation of fault-tolerance. In this context,
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evolvability is defined “as the property of a software to be updated to fulfill a newly
prioritised set of functionalities”.
3 Wrapping up
We hope that this Special Issue will trigger further discussion on the intriguing notion
of reliability. We considerably increased our understanding of such multifaceted and
fundamental epistemological notion, and will treasure all contributions in our future
work. All papers are worth engaging with and we wish them all great impact. We do,
however, want to caution against only using impact factors to reliably measure (their)
impact Greenwood (2007).
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